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Abstract 
Despite the increased visibility and acceptance of the LGBTQ community, sexual minorities 
continue to face prejudice and discrimination in many domains. Past research has shown that this 
prejudice is more prevalent among those holding conservative political views. In two studies, we 
merge strategic essentialism and motivated ideology theoretical perspectives to empirically 
investigate the link between political orientation and sexual prejudice. More specifically, we 
examine how conservatives strategically use different forms of essentialism to support their 
views of gay individuals and their reactions to messages aimed at changing essentializing beliefs. 
In Study 1 (N = 220), we demonstrate that conservatives endorse social essentialism (i.e. the 
belief that gay and straight people are fundamentally different from each other) more than 
liberals do. In turn, they blame gay individuals more for their sexual orientation and show more 
prejudice towards them. At the same time, conservatives endorse trait essentialism (i.e. the belief 
that sexual orientation is a fixed attribute that cannot be changed) less than liberals do, which in 
turn predicts greater levels of blame and prejudice for conservatives relative to liberals. In Study 
2 (N = 217), we additionally show that conservatives, but not liberals, are resistant to messages 
aimed at increasing trait essentialism and reducing prejudice toward sexual minorities. We 
discuss theoretical and practical implications of these findings. 
Abstract Word Count = 216 
Word Count = 8,114 
Key words: sexual orientation, sexual prejudice, essentialism, political ideology, blame, stigma, 
conservatism 
  3
Understanding sexual prejudice: 
The role of political ideology and strategic essentialism 
 Sexual minorities are often the target of widespread discrimination and experience 
inequities in many domains, ranging from employment, to healthcare, to education (DeSouza, 
Wesselmann, & Ispas, 2017; D’Augelli,1989; Eliason & Schope, 2001; Elliot et al., 2015; Hebl, 
Foster, Mannix, & Dovidio, 2002). Additionally, evidence is accumulating that experiencing 
social-identity based discrimination contributes to adverse mental and physical health 
consequences (Doyle & Molix, 2016; Pascoe & Richman, 2009). Although there are many 
factors that influence sexual orientation-based discrimination, one potent predictor is people’s 
attitudes toward sexual minorities, or their sexual prejudice. Sexual prejudice refers to “negative 
attitudes toward an individual because of her or his sexual orientation” (Herek, 2000). In this 
research, we aim to gain a better understanding of the complex roots of sexual prejudice by 
merging work linking political ideology to prejudice with research on essentialist thinking.   
Political Orientation and Sexual Prejudice 
 Heterosexism, the stigma attached to sexual minorities that is embedded within 
institutions and ideological systems (Herek, 2007), plays a powerful role in promoting sexual 
prejudice and discrimination (Herek, 2009a). Ample research has demonstrated the prejudice and 
discrimination against sexual minorities that emanates from the heterosexism within political 
conservatism (Herek, 2009b; Hoyt & Parry, 2018; Van der Toorn, Jost, Packer, Noorbaloochi, & 
Van Bavel, 2017; Yang, 1998). From a motivated social cognition framework, political ideology 
is a powerful motivational force (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Jost & Amodio, 
2012).  The conservative, relative to liberal, ideology is motivated by underlying needs for 
certainty, security, and solidarity (Jost & Amodio, 2012). Conservativism stresses that existing 
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social, economic, and political arrangements are fair and legitimate and that inequality is 
justified (Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Rasinski, 1987; Skitka & Tetlock, 1993). Thus, conservatives 
relative to liberals are more likely to adopt beliefs that help legitimize inequalities, including 
certain types of essentialism beliefs (Hoyt, Forsyth, & Burnette, 2018; Keller, 2005; Rangel & 
Keller, 2011). Considering the robust evidence demonstrating psychological flexibility in 
essentialist thinking (Ryazanov & Christenfeld, 2018), in the current work, we suggest that 
political ideology is a foundational ideological belief system that motivates the endorsement of 
essentialist beliefs in in a manner that serves to justify prejudice toward sexual minorities 
(Hegarty & Golden, 2008).  
Dimensions and Strategic Use of Essentialist Thinking  
Research reveals two main dimensions of essentialism—social essentialism and trait 
essentialism (Ryazanov& Christenfeld, 2018). Social essentialism refers to the essentialism of 
categories of people that differ on socially relevant attributes, such as race or gender (Rothbart & 
Taylor, 1992). Groups or categories which are seen as essential are thought to share an 
underlying “essence” that makes members similar to each other and different from other groups. 
They are also often seen as “natural”, biologically determined, and as having clearly defined 
boundaries (Rhodes & Gelman, 2009). This type of essentialism has often been discussed as a 
source of stereotyping and prejudice, although more recent evidence suggests that the picture is 
more complex (Ryazanov & Christenfeld, 2018). Trait essentialism, on the other hand, refers to 
the essentialism of specific human traits, such as intelligence or weight. Trait essentialism can be 
grounded in the implicit theory framework which distinguishes between growth mindsets, the 
belief that human attributes are malleable, and fixed mindsets, the belief that attributes are stable 
(Dweck, 1999; Haslam,, Bastian, Bain, & Kashima, 2006). In other words, trait essentialism can 
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be viewed as similar to a fixed mindset, that is, the belief that an attribute is immutable. Similar 
to social essentialism, trait essentialism has been primarily viewed negatively. For example, 
individuals with fixed, relative to growth mindsets are more likely to be punitive (Dweck, Chui, 
& Hong, 1995), endorse more stereotyping (e.g., Levy, Stroessner, & Dweck, 1998) and are less 
likely to confront prejudice (Rattan & Dweck, 2010). Overall, individuals with fixed, relative to 
growth mindsets, make more trait judgments and prefer retribution versus remediation in the 
wake of negative behavior (Dweck et al., 1995). 
 However, despite early work showing that both social and trait essentialism/fixed 
mindsets both predict greater stereotyping, we suggest these beliefs have different implications 
for blame and subsequent prejudice towards members of devalued social groups.  Working from 
the literature showing robust negative correlations between biological essentialist explanations of 
sexual orientation and sexual prejudice, researchers have endeavored to experimentally 
demonstrate the causal link between essentialist beliefs and prejudice against sexual minorities 
(Hegarty & Golden, 2008). The one thing that is clear from this body of work is that the 
association between messages promoting an essential view of sexual orientation and sexual 
prejudice is not straightforward. For example, in a study looking at sexual prejudice amongst 
male participants, Falomir-Pichastor and Mugny (2009) found that highlighting biological 
differences between homosexual and heterosexual men did decrease prejudice among their male 
participants; however, the process appeared to not be driven by beliefs that people cannot change 
their sexual orientation (trait essentialism) but rather by the male participants’ viewing 
themselves as fundamentally different from gay men (social essentialism).  Other work has 
shown a link between less essentialist views and decreased prejudice.  For example, in Hegarty’s 
(2010) work they showed that not presenting essentialist biological theories to students was 
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associated with both decreased essentialist beliefs as well as decreased prejudice. Importantly, it 
was the decrease in social, not trait, essentialism that was causally associated with prejudice 
reduction. Moreover, other research has shown no effect of messages either supporting or 
refuting biologically determinism on prejudice (Hegarty & Golden, 2008). These inconsistent 
findings suggest that essentialist messages can be strategically endorsed, rejected, or interpreted 
(Falomir-Pichastor & Hegarty, 2014). In this work, we set forth to help elucidate these seemingly 
contradictory findings by delineating how the two different facets of essentialism, social and trait 
essentialism, have divergent implications for moral responsibility and prejudice. 
 The distinction between social and trait beliefs can have significant implications for 
members of devalued social groups who can be essentialized in terms of both the social category 
they belong to and specific individual attributes, such as sexual minorities. In line with this 
argument, research indicates that essentialism is neither a general, fixed, trait, which is 
indiscriminately applied to all social groups or all traits, nor a uniformly problematic or 
maladaptive process. Instead, individuals strategically employ essentialist beliefs and messages 
to achieve their goals (see Ryazanov & Christenfeld, 2018). For example, for social essentialism, 
there is a general association between essentializing race and racial prejudice, but this 
relationship vanished when race was used to exclude their own group (Morton, Hornsey, & 
Postmes, 2009). In other words, prejudiced participants only endorsed racial essentialism when it 
benefitted, but not when it disadvantaged their group. For trait essentialism, the stigma 
asymmetry model suggests that fixed messages and beliefs can both increase and decrease 
weight stigma via opposing mechanisms (Hoyt, Burnette, Auster-Gussman, Blodorn, & Major, 
2017). For example, fixed beliefs predict less blame which reduces internalized stigma but also 
predicts weaker beliefs in the potential to offset the condition in the future which increases 
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internalized stigma (Burnette, Hoyt, Dweck, Auster-Gussman, 2017). In line with findings on 
strategic essentialism and the stigma asymmetry model, we argue that essentialism can both 
enhance and decrease prejudice against sexual minorities.  
Similarly to social and trait essentialism, research within the context of sexual orientation 
shows that beliefs about the nature of sexual orientation vary along two dimensions of 
essentialism—what has been termed fundamentality and immutability (Hegarty & Pratto, 2001). 
Fundamental essentialism refers to the categorization of individuals as essentially heterosexual 
or sexual minority (i.e., social essentialism), and immutability which refers to the extent to which 
people deem the attribute of sexual orientation as more or less fixed (i.e., trait essentialism).  
These two domains of sexual orientation essentialist beliefs are distinct yet related constructs; 
they have been shown to negatively predict each other such that the belief in one of them is 
associated with the rejection of the other (Hegarty & Pratto, 2001). Importantly, they have 
contradictory implications for the acceptance of sexual minorities. Believing that homosexuality 
is a fundamental and informative category (social essentialism) predicts anti-gay attitudes 
whereas believing that sexual orientation is biologically based and unchangeable (trait 
essentialism) predicts greater tolerance for sexual minorities (Haslam & Levy, 2006; Haslam, 
Rothschild, & Ernst, 2002; Hegarty, 2010; Hegarty & Pratto, 2001).  
Essentialism and Moral Responsibility 
 We suggest that the contrary implications that these facets of essentialism have for sexual 
prejudice stem largely from the differing implications they have for moral responsibility and/or 
blame.  On the one hand, social essentialism increases prejudice by strengthening evaluations 
regarding the extent to which people are responsible for their stigma as it reflects a person’s 
moral core or character (Alicke, 2000; Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014; Ryazanov 
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&Christenfeld 2018).  This character-focused approach to understanding judgments stems from 
work in virtue ethics that focuses on being rather than doing (Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2011). 
That is, the morality of behaviors are often gauged in terms of the extent to which that behavior 
reflects an underlying good or bad character.  Thus, believing that sexual minorities have an 
inherent differentness and devalued character that sets them apart from sexual majorities (i.e., 
social essentialism), can strengthen the extent to which they are seen as morally responsible for 
their sexual orientation. Indeed, previous research has shown that beliefs in clearly bounded 
sexual orientation categories are linked to sexual prejudice (Hegarty, 2010). In summary, beliefs 
that sexual orientation is a naturalized social category can be used to promote beliefs that sexual 
minorities are flawed at their very core, and responsible for this flaw, thereby promoting sexual 
prejudice. 
On the other hand, trait essentialism should reduce prejudice via a reduction in blame. A 
vast literature steeped in attribution theory indicates that beliefs about the control and choice that 
people have over their behaviors affect the extent to which they are blamed (Weiner, 1985).  
According to attribution theory, the more people view stigmatized people as responsible for their 
stigma, the more prejudice they exhibit toward members of that group (Weiner, Perry, 
Magnussion, 1988). As Crandall (2000, p. 129) noted: “An attribution of internal controllability 
points the finger of blame directly at stigmatized individuals: Since they are responsible for their 
fate, they have earned its consequence.” Opposition to sexual minorities loses moral force when 
understood as non-volitional (Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011). Thus, beliefs in the fixed 
underpinnings of sexual orientation, that is, trait essentialism, enables people to make a judgment 
that sexual minorities should not be held accountable, or blamed, for their sexual orientation. In 
support of this, there is a growing body of research suggesting that perceiving individuals as 
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responsible for their sexual orientation predicts higher levels of sexual prejudice against sexual 
minorities relative to perceiving lower levels of responsibility (Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2008). 
Thus, believing the determinants of sexual orientation to be fixed can serve to decrease prejudice 
by reducing the blame and responsibility placed on sexual minorities (Crandall & Reser, 2005).   
Conceptualization of Current Work 
  We merge strategic essentialism and motivated ideology theoretical perspectives to 
empirically investigate sources of sexual prejudice.  We bring more nuance to the relationship 
between conservatism and prejudice by distinguishing between social and trait essentialism. We 
aim to show that conservatism motivates both the essentialism belief that homosexuality is a 
fundamental and informative category (i.e., social essentialism) and the anti-essentialist belief 
that sexual orientation is a choice and changeable (i.e., low trait essentialism), both of which 
serve to promote sexual prejudice via blame. First, we seek to replicate findings showing that 
greater conservatism predicts greater prejudice against sexual minorities. Second, we test the 
prediction that political ideology motivates the strategic employment of two different facets of 
essentialism to justify sexual prejudice. Specifically, we predict that the link between 
conservativism and sexual prejudice will be mediated through stronger beliefs that sexual 
orientation is a naturalized social category (i.e., social essentialism) and in turn greater blame, as 
well as weaker beliefs that the determinants of sexual orientation are fixed (i.e., trait 
essentialism) and in turn greater blame (see Figure 1 for the theoretical representation).  We test 
these first two hypotheses in Study 1.  In Study 2, we test a third hypothesis stemming from the 
motivated social cognition perspective on political ideology (Jost et al., 2003). Based on the 
work showing that essentialist beliefs serve to satisfy social-cognitive needs for conservatives 
(Keller, 2005), it should be difficult to push around these beliefs. However, these social and 
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cognitive motives have not been similarly shown to underpin liberals’ essentialism beliefs. Thus, 
we predict that attempts to promote the belief that the determinants of sexual orientation are 
fixed (i.e., trait essentialism) will be met with resistance from conservatives.  
Study 1 
Method 
Participants and procedure. In Studies 1 and 2, we recruited participants from the 
United States using Mechanical Turk, an internet marketplace used to recruit diverse online 
samples shown to be a source of high quality data (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; 
Casler, Bickel, & Hackett, 2013). In Study 1, we recruited two hundred thirty-three participants; 
thirteen participants failed attention checks resulting in a final size of 2201 (52% female; 48% 
male) with a mean age of 33.69 years (SD=10.94). We assessed implicit theories before 
assessing measures of essentialism, blame, sexual prejudice, and political ideology.  
Measures 
Scores for all measures were computed by calculating mean responses to all items on the 
scale. 
Attention-check items. Participants were asked to respond ‘strongly agree’ to three 
items embedded in the measures. Those who did not accurately respond to all three items were 
removed from analyses2. 
Political ideology. Using a 7-point scale (very liberal to very conservative), people 
responded to the following three questions: “My political views are…”,  “My fiscal political 
                                                        
1 In both studies, sample sizes were selected to ensure adequate power to detect medium-sized relationships (Wilson 
Van Voorhis & Morgan, 2007).  
2
 In both studies, results are similar when these participants are retained for analyses. 
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views are…” and “My social political views are…” (Hoyt & Parry, 2018). Higher scores 
represent more conservative ideologies (α = .93). 
Essentialism. Participants responded to the nine essentialism items developed by 
Haslam, Rothschild, and Ernst (2000) and the nine items from the Sexual Orientations Belief 
scale (Hegarty & Pratto, 2001). Both scales have been shown to comprise that two factors that 
we are calling social and trait essentialism. We conducted principal components analyses with 
oblique rotated loadings and identified the items that loaded on one of the two factors. We 
combined items from both scales that loaded onto respective factors to create the scales. 
Participants were asked to respond on 7-point scales with higher numbers representing more 
essentialist thinking.  Both the social essentialism scale (α = .76) and the trait essentialism scale 
(α = .81) have seven items each (see Appendix).    
In an additional approach to assess trait essentialism, we modified a well-validated and 
reliable scale of implicit theories (e.g., Burnette, 2010) to gauge beliefs about sexual orientation. 
The scale consists of six items, with three fixed-worded items and three change-worded items. A 
sample item included “You have a certain sexual orientation, and you can’t really do much to 
change it” (fixed worded), and “Your sexual orientation is something that can change over time” 
(change worded). Participants responded to each item on a 7-point scale (strongly disagree to 
strongly agree). We recoded items such that higher numbers represent agreement with a fixed 
mindset of sexuality (α = .86). This scale was highly correlated with the trait essentialism scale (r 
(218) = .75, p < .001)3, so we combined all 13 items into one highly reliable trait essentialism 
scale (α = .90).  
                                                        
3 The fixed mindset of sexuality measure was also significantly negatively associated with social essentialism, but 
the association was weaker (r (218) = -.34, p < .001). 
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Blame attributions. We assessed the extent to which participants blame gay people for 
their sexuality by using a 6-item scale we developed for this research. Sample items included 
“It’s people own fault if they are gay,” and “People wouldn’t become gay if they stayed on the 
right path.” Participants responded on a 7-point scale, ranging from strongly disagree to strongly 
agree.  Higher numbers indicate greater levels of blame (α = .96). 
Sexual prejudice. We assessed sexual prejudice with two scales. We used the 10-item 
Attitudes toward Gay Men subscale of the Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men Scale 
(Herek, 1994) and we modified the 7-item dislike subscale of the Anti-fat Attitudes (AFA; 
Crandall, 1994) scale that measures antipathy toward obese individuals to instead capture 
antipathy toward sexual minorities. Sample items include “I don’t really like gay people much,” 
and “Although some gay people are surely moral, in general, I think they tend not to be as moral 
as straight people.” Both measures were highly correlated, we combined all 17 items into one 
highly reliable measure of anti-gay prejudice (α = .97).   
Results  
See Table 1 for scale means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations across both 
studies. Blame attributions and sexual prejudice were positively skewed. Analyses with 
transformed data reveal indistinguishable results; we present results from the untransformed data.  
 Serial indirect effects analysis.  To test the predictions that political ideology motivates 
the strategic employment of different facets of essentialism to predict blame and subsequently 
sexual prejudice, we conducted indirect effect analyses using Hayes’ PROCESS (2013) macro 
Model 80 that specifies a serial multiple mediator model assuming a specified causal chain 
linking the mediators (see Figure 1).  First, in support of Hypothesis 1, there was a total effect of 
ideology on prejudice (total effect=.41; CI=.32,.50). In line with past work, conservatives report 
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more prejudice than liberals. Next, there was a significant positive indirect effect of political 
ideology on sexual prejudice through social essentialism and blame (indirect effect=.21; 
CI=.14,.29). The direction of the effects indicated that more conservatism predicted more social 
essentialism (B=.38; t=11.31, p<.001; CI=.32,.45) and more social essentialism beliefs predicted 
more blame (B=.95; t=13.02, p<.001; CI=.81,1.09). In turn, more blame predicted more 
prejudice (B=.57, t=11.08, p<.001; CI=.47,.67).  Additionally, analyses with 95% confidence 
intervals revealed a significant positive indirect effect of political ideology on sexual prejudice 
through trait essentialism and blame (indirect effect=.04; CI=.02,.06). The direction of the effects 
indicated that more conservatism predicted less trait essentialism (B=-.23; t=-5.51, p<.001; 
CI=-.31,-.15) and lower trait essentialism beliefs predicted more blame (B=-.28; t=-4.68, p<.001; 
CI=-.40,-.16). In turn, more blame predicted more prejudice (B=.57, t=11.08, p<.001; 
CI=.47,.67). Finally, we conducted contrast analyses on the indirect effects that revealed the 
indirect effects are statistically different from one another. Specifically, conservatism exerts a 
significantly stronger effect on prejudice through social essentialism and blame than through trait 
essentialism and blame (contrast = -.17, CI=-.25, -.10).    
In summary, both hypotheses were confirmed.  Stronger conservative beliefs predicted 
greater levels of sexual prejudice and this effect is mediated through both higher levels of social 
essentialism and in turn more blame and lower levels of trait essentialism and in turn more 
blame.  
Study 2 
 Whereas essentialism beliefs can be motivated by political ideology, these beliefs can 
also be influenced by messages about the nature of sexual orientation in the media.  In this study, 
we sought to examine how media messages about the nature of sexual orientation influences 
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people’s essentialism beliefs and whether this depends upon political ideology.  The dominant 
contemporary discourse pertaining to sexual orientation has been firmly rooted in arguments of 
whether sexual orientation is inborn or not (Watson & Shapiro, 1995). Thus, these messages are 
generally focused on the attribute of sexual orientation, and thus deal with trait essentialism, 
rather than sexual minorities and heterosexuals as social groups (i.e., social essentialism). We 
suggest that messages regarding the different origins of sexual orientation, with focuses ranging 
from brain structures, to genes, to hormonal and/or environmental influences (see Bailey et al., 
2016), have important implications for prejudice against sexual minorities that are dependent 
upon political ideology.  Specifically, to the extent that conservatism motivates the belief that 
sexual orientation is a choice and is changeable in order to justify prejudice, conservatives 
should be resistant to messages about the fixed nature of sexual orientation (Jost et al., 2003; 
Keller, 2005).  However, given the robust literature on political ideology and motivation has not 
shown similar motives underlying liberals’ essentialism beliefs, we did not expect liberals to be 
resistant to a message designed to alter their essentialism beliefs.  Because we are presenting 
messages seen in day to day media and these messages focus on the immutable nature of sexual 
orientation (i.e. trait essentialism), these predictions focus on trait essentialism. It is unclear 
whether these messages will also influence on social essentialism beliefs. Finally, we do not have 
predictions regarding whether the essentialism messages will have direct effects on blame and 
prejudice but we will explore this in our analyses. 
Method 
Participants and procedure. Two hundred twenty-five participants were recruited from 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to take part in Study 2. Eight participants were screened out based 
on their failure to respond properly to the attention checks, leaving a final sample size of 217 
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(48% female; 52% male) with a mean age of 35.08 years (SD = 12.61).   
Using an experimental approach commonly used in the implicit theory literature (e.g., 
Burnette, 2010) to manipulate beliefs about the nature of sexual orientation, we randomly 
assigned participants to read one of two shortened versions of actual news articles from The 
Guardian newspaper (Copland, 2015; Rahman, 2015): one arguing that sexual orientation might 
not be fixed, another arguing for the genetic underpinning of sexual orientations. After reading 
the respective article, participants were asked to summarize the main message of the article in 
one sentence and, using a 5-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree, they indicated 
agreement with the article being easy to understand, interesting, and the argument being 
convincing. Similar to past work, we used this component to reduce suspicion about the nature of 
the article and subsequent assessments. Next, participants completed the same measures as in 
Study 1: political ideology (α =.93), social essentialism (α =.73), trait essentialism (α = .92), 
blame attributions (α =.96), and sexual prejudice (α =.75).  
Results 
See Table 1 for scale means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations. Once again, in 
support of our first hypothesis, conservatism strongly positively predicted both blame and 
prejudice. Again, blame and sexual prejudice were positively skewed and analyses with 
transformed data reveal indistinguishable results; we report results from the untransformed data.   
First, we conducted a multivariate ANOVA, to examine the effect of condition on both 
measures of essentialism, F (2,214) = 5.80, p = .004; Wilks’ lambda = .949, partial η2=.05. Tests 
of between subjects effects revealed that participants who had read an article claiming that sexual 
orientation was fixed reported greater levels of trait essentialism (M=5.22; SD=1.20) than those 
who read that sexual orientation was changeable (M=4.70; SD=1.05; F(1,215) =11.63, p=.001; 
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partial η2=.05).  However, reported social essentialism did not differ across fixed (M=3.01; 
SD=1.07) and changeable (M = 3.20; SD = 1.02) conditions (F(1,215)=1.61, p=.205).  Thus, the 
manipulation was effective in pushing around trait essentialism in the predicted directions.  
Additionally, we examined whether condition had an effect on blame and prejudice by 
conducting a multivariate ANOVA on both outcome variables. The multivariate test was not 
significant and neither were the tests of between-subjects effects.   
We then examined if political ideology moderates the effect of condition on blame, 
prejudice, and both types of essentialism.  We conducted simple moderation analyses employing 
Process Model 1, mean centering the variables and regressing our two measures of essentialism 
on political ideology, condition (1=Fixed, -1= Changeable), and their interaction. For both blame 
and prejudice, there was no significant effect of condition (blame: B=-.07, p=.470, CI=-.25,.11; 
prejudice: B=-.04, p=.470, CI=-.14,.06) and no significant interaction between condition and 
political ideology (blame: B=.01, p=.876, CI=-.10,.12; prejudice: B=-.01, p=.707, CI=-.07,.05). 
However, there were significant effects of political ideology with greater conservatism predicting 
more blame (B=.51, p<.001; CI=.40,.62) and more prejudice (B=.26, p<.001; CI=.20,.33). Next, 
social essentialism was significantly predicted by political ideology (B=.37, p<.001; CI=.29,.44) 
such that more conservativism predicted stronger social essentialist beliefs. Condition did not 
significantly predict social essentialism (B=-.11, p=.063, CI=.13,.42), although there was a non-
significant trend such that those in the fixed condition reported lower levels of social 
essentialism. Finally, the interaction between political ideology and condition was not significant 
(B=.05, p=.163, CI=-.02,.12).   
Lastly and most important, we examined the effect of condition and ideology on trait 
essentialism. Political ideology significantly predicted trait essentialism (B=-.21, p<.001; 
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CI=-.30,-.13) such that conservativism predicted lower levels of trait essentialism. Next, 
condition significantly predicted trait essentialism (B=.27, p=.001, CI=.13,.42) such that those in 
the fixed condition reported greater levels of trait essentialism. Finally, there was a significant 
interaction between political ideology and condition (B=-.09, p=.036, CI=-.18,-.01).  The 
conditional effects revealed that liberal participants (-1 SD) reported significantly greater levels 
of trait essentialism in the fixed condition relative to the changeable condition (B=.44; t=4.09, 
p<.001; CI=.23, .65) whereas there was no significant effect of condition on conservatives’ (+1 
SD) reported trait essentialism (B=.12; t=1.23, p=.221; CI=-.08, .32). Alternatively, in the fixed 
condition, ideology significantly predicts essentialism (B=-.30; t=-4.96, p<.001; CI=-.43, -.18) 
but not in the changeable condition (B=-.12; t=-1.80, p=.074; CI=-.24, .01) (see Figure 2.) Thus, 
these findings support our third hypothesis that the manipulation will be more effective in 
pushing around essentialism for liberals relative to conservatives. Specifically, as predicted, 
conservatives, who are more likely to hold lower levels of trait essentialism views, appear to be 
resistant to the fixed message.  
We then turned to testing whether the mediational predictions supported in Study 1 
replicated in Study 2. Specifically, we ran a serial mediation analysis similar to the one reported 
in Study 1. As there was no effect of condition, or interactive effect of ideology and condition, 
on social essentialism, we conducted a serial multiple mediator model with political ideology 
predicting sexual prejudice through social essentialism and then blame, Process Model 6, 
controlling for condition (results are indistinguishable without this control; see Figure 3).  
Replicating results from Study 1, there was a significant total effect of ideology on prejudice 
(total effect=.22, CI=.16,.29).  Additionally, there was a significant indirect effect of political 
ideology on sexual prejudice through social essentialism and blame (indirect effect=.11; 
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CI=.07,.16). The direction of the effects indicated that more conservative participants held more 
social essentialist beliefs (B=.37; t=10.16, p<.001; CI=.29,.44) which were associated with 
higher levels of blame (B=.95; t=11.20, p<.001; CI=.78,.12). In turn, more blame predicted more 
sexual prejudice (B=.33, t=9.26, p<.001; CI=.26,.39).  Thus, greater levels of conservatism 
predicted greater levels of prejudice through higher levels of social essentialism and in turn more 
blame. 
Finally, given condition moderated the effect of ideology on trait essentialism, we 
conducted a moderated mediational analysis using Process Model 83, examining the serial 
multiple mediator model assuming the specified causal chain linking ideology to prejudice 
through essentialism and then blame, and including condition as a moderator of the link between 
ideology and essentialism (see Figure 4).  Importantly, this analysis revealed a significant 
indirect effect of ideology on prejudice through essentialism and blame in the fixed condition 
(indirect effect=.08; CI=.04,.14), but the indirect effect was not significant in the changeable 
condition (indirect effect=.03; CI=-.01,.07). The direction of the effect is such that conservatism 
predicted lower levels of trait essentialism (B=-.21; t=-4.79, p<.001; CI=-.30,-.13), trait 
essentialism negatively predicts blame (B=-.65; t=-9.25, p<.001; CI=-.79,-.51), which in turn 
positively predicts prejudice (B=.43; t=13.06, p<.001; CI=.36,.49). Although the indirect effect is 
significant in the fixed and not the malleable condition, the index of moderated mediation is not 
quite significant at the 95% confidence level (index of moderated mediation=.05, CI=-.00,.11) 
but is significant at the 90% confidence level (index of moderated mediation=.05, CI=.01,.10) 
indicating that this finding is not robust. 
Although we cannot be certain of which condition is driving the results because we did 
not have a no-message control condition, results from Study 2 are consistent with our theoretical 
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predictions that it is harder to manipulate conservatives’, relative to liberals’, essentialism 
beliefs.  In the case of trait essentialism, which is negatively associated with conservatism, it 
should be harder to increase conservatives’ trait essentialism than to decrease liberals’ trait 
essentialism.  Indeed, in the fixed condition conservatives still reported significantly lower trait 
essentialism than liberals suggesting that the message was not effective in raising their 
essentialism. But, in the changeable condition there was no difference between liberals’ and 
conservatives’ essentialism scores suggesting that the changeable condition was effective at 
promoting less trait essentialism beliefs in liberals.  Moreover, the analyses showing that the 
indirect effect is significant in the fixed, and not the changeable, condition further suggests that 
the fixed condition was not effective for promoting fixed beliefs in conservatives but the 
changeable condition was effective in decreasing liberals’ essentialism to levels similar to 
conservatives thereby disrupting the mediational processes.  
Discussion 
In this research, we replicated the finding that conservatives, relative to liberals, report 
greater sexual prejudice. We add a more nuanced understanding of this link between political 
ideology and prejudice toward sexual minorities. More specifically, this link is mediated through 
both greater levels of social essentialism and in turn greater blame, as well as lower levels of trait 
essentialism and in turn greater blame. Finally, an attempt to manipulate essentialism beliefs (at 
least for trait essentialism) was unsuccessful for conservatives, who are more likely to justify 
discrimination with these essentialist beliefs. 
The current research makes important theoretical and practical contributions to our 
understanding of sexual prejudice. For example, it extends a growing body of literature showing 
that beliefs in the fixed nature of attributes is associated with both decreased and increased 
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prejudice (Hoyt et al., 2017). And, the findings clarify some of the contradictory evidence and 
provide a better understanding of how beliefs that sexual orientation is a discrete, fundamental 
category and beliefs that sexual orientation is biologically based and immutable are linked to 
sexual prejudice (Haslam et al., 2002; Hegarty, 2010; Hegarty & Pratto, 2001). Social 
psychological approaches to understanding sexual prejudice were originally grounded in an 
attribution theory framework focusing on the link between fixed beliefs and decreased blame and 
prejudice (Weiner et al., 1988). Indeed, “attribution theory has lent political support to biological 
essentialist theories of sexual orientation” (Hegarty, 2002; p. 163). However, there was soon 
growing evidence that deterministic, unchanging conceptions of sexual orientation can also come 
with costs in terms of prejudice (Hegarty & Pratto, 2001). Mounting evidence continues to send 
mixed messages (Haslam & Levy, 2006; Hegarty & Golden, 2008). We help bring clarity to 
these findings by making the important distinction between social (fundamental) and trait 
(immutable) essentialism and the process linking these essentialist beliefs to prejudice. 
Specifically, drawing upon both character-based approaches to morality and attribution theory, 
we show that these two essentialism beliefs have different implications for moral 
responsibility/blame, an important mediator between essentialism beliefs and prejudice. 
 We also contribute to the nascent literature examining the strategic employment of 
essentialism (Ryazanov & Christenfeld, 2018) by showing that political conservatism can 
motivate the endorsement and rejection of essentialism beliefs in a manner that can help justify 
prejudice against sexual minorities. Our research is consistent with prejudice frameworks 
suggesting that there are primal, genuine prejudicial attitudes that can be modulated by relevant 
motivational and belief systems (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Hegarty & Golden, 2008).  In 
Study 2 we were unable to push around trait essentialism beliefs in those most prone to 
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prejudice, lending further support for the argument that these beliefs are marshalled to justify 
extant prejudice.  However, more research is necessary to help tease apart the causal relations 
amongst these variables. Additionally, future work should examine the role of political ideology 
in motivating the use of strategic essentialism of other devalued social groups that can be 
essentialized in terms of both the social category they belong to and specific individual 
attributes, such as obese or mentally ill individuals. Moreover, future work should examine other 
ideologies that can serve to motivate strategic essentialism.  
It is important to note the limitations of our studies. First, we used actual newspaper 
articles to capture messages that people may be exposed to in real life. However, this also means 
that the articles differed in many ways, not just in the messages about the fixedness of sexual 
orientation. Future research should test the effects in a more controlled way, potentially also 
investigating the effects of a message that clearly states that sexual orientation is a choice. 
Moreover, the messages in the articles only targeted trait essentialism, not social essentialism. It 
would be interesting to investigate whether, in line with the ideas of strategic essentialism, 
conservatives would be more receptive to messages promoting social essentialism, while liberals 
would be more resistant to them. Lastly, our measure of sexual prejudice focused on “gay 
people”, which may have been interpreted as meaning gay men. Future research should examine 
whether the same effects hold true for prejudice towards lesbians as well as bisexual and 
pansexual men and women. 
Despite limitations, this research has important implications for approaches to lessen 
prejudice against sexual minorities. The dominant approach to reducing such prejudice has been 
to promote a narrative that sexual orientation comes from fixed origins.  However, our research 
contributes to the mounting evidence demonstrating that conceptualizing stigmatized 
  22
characteristics as unchangeable comes with both benefits and costs in terms of prejudice—and 
our work delineates how these psychological processes co-occur.  Furthermore, to the extent that 
ideology motivates the strategic employment of understandings of the fixed nature of sexual 
orientation, ideology might also promote biased interpretations of scientific findings related to 
the stability/instability of sexual orientation such as work showing biological bases of sexual 
orientation (Ngun & Vilain, 2014) or evidence of sexual fluidity in sexual attraction (Diamond, 
2008).  Moreover, relying on narratives of unchanging origins can subjugate prejudice and 
antipathy to scientific findings or, more nefariously, can be used as grounds for eugenic 
arguments. Thus, activists who are focused on undermining prejudice might focus on shifting the 
discourse around sexual orientation from one that focuses on where it comes from, to an 
alternative conversation such as one focused on social justice (Jayaratne et al., 2006).   
 In sum, we have shown that essentialist beliefs are strategically employed in line with 
one’s political ideology. While conservatives more readily endorse beliefs that people of 
different sexual orientations are inherently different from each other, which, in turn, predicts 
higher levels of sexual prejudice, liberals are more likely to hold views of sexual orientation as 
immutable, which predicts lower levels of prejudice. Thus, those who are most prejudiced are 
more likely to endorse the beliefs associated with greater blame and prejudice.  Moreover, those 
who are the most prejudiced against sexual minorities are also the most resistant to messages 
designed to change these beliefs. It may therefore be a more beneficial strategy to promote 
messages that focus on the fact that there is nothing wrong with being gay, regardless of the 
origin of sexual orientation. 
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Table 1: Scale means, standard deviations, intercorrelations, and scale reliabilities. 
Dependent Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 
Study 1       
Political ideology 3.22 1.69     
Social essentialism 3.00  1.06 .61***    
Trait essentialism 5.09  1.11 -.35*** -.35***   
Blame 2.30 1.56 .58*** .79*** -.47***  
Sexual Prejudice 2.35 1.42 .62*** .78*** -.37*** .86*** 
Study 2       
Political ideology 3.43 1.63     
Social essentialism 3.10  1.05 .57***    
Trait essentialism 4.97  1.16 -.30*** -.42***   
Blame 2.37 1.58 .53*** .73*** -.59***  
Sexual Prejudice 3.07 .87 .49*** .66*** -.36*** .76*** 
* = p <.05; ** = p <.01; ***= p < .001 
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Figure 1. Political ideology influences sexual prejudice through strategic essentializing and 
subsequent responsibility and blame attributions (Process Model 4). 
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Figure 2. Study 2: The effect of condition and political ideology on trait essentialism. 
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Figure 3. Study 2: Serial multiple mediator model with political ideology predicting sexual 
prejudice through social essentialism and then blame (Process Model 6).  
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Figure 4. Study 2: Moderated mediational analysis examining the serial multiple mediator model 
assuming the specified causal chain linking ideology to prejudice through essentialism and then 
blame, and including message condition as a moderator of the link between ideology and 
essentialism (Process Model 83).  
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